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INTRODUCTION
n the 1990s, the former Yugoslavia plunged into chaos as
various segments of the nation declared independence,
while the government in Belgrade sought to maintain control of
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the region. Nationalist politicians inflamed age-old ethnic tensions, resulting in horrific war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes
against humanity, and the worst genocide to occur in Europe
since the Second World War. As a result of the conflict, the
United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) created the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (the
“ICTY”)1. The ICTY was given jurisdiction to prosecute genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity that were committed
in the former Yugoslavia. Since its creation, the ICTY has been
the standard-bearer for modern international criminal tribunals.
One of the individuals tried by the ICTY was Momčilo Perišić
(“Perišić”), the former Chief of the Yugoslav Army General
Staff.2 At trial, Perišić was convicted on twelve of the thirteen
counts with which he was charged, and sentenced to twentyseven years’ imprisonment.3 Over half of the counts against
Perišić alleged that he had aided and abetted the Army of the
Republic of Srpska (the “VRS”)—specifically, that he had provided substantial aid to the VRS, knowing that such aid would
facilitate the VRS’s ability to commit war crimes and crimes
against humanity.4 On appeal, the Trial Chamber’s decision was
reversed and Perišić was completely acquitted.5 The Perišić Appeals Chamber held, among other things, that the Trial Chamber improperly ignored the issue of whether Perišić’s actions
were “specifically directed” toward facilitating the VRS’s crimes
and that, without proof of specific direction, Perišić could not be
found guilty of aiding and abetting the VRS.6
1 S.C. Res. 827, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); see also Theodor
Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS No.
3, 122–35 (Summer 1993).
2 Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 2 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Perišić TC
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81, Trial Chamber Judgment
Summary, p. 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Perišić TC Judgment Summary].
3 Perišić TC Judgment, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1836, 1838.
4 Id. ¶¶ 1627, 1631.
5 Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶,
120, 122 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Perišić Appeals Judgment].
6 Id. ¶ 58.
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This Article traces the development of international criminal
law with respect to aiding and abetting responsibility and concludes that the “specific direction” standard, as set forth by the
Appeals Chamber in Perišić, should either be rejected outright
or modified to explicitly include a “reasonable person” due diligence standard. Section I of this Article discusses individual
criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting prior to the creation of the ICTY. Section II considers the ICTY’s pre-Perišić interpretation of aiding and abetting responsibility. Section III
discusses the Perišić case in detail at both the trial and appellate
levels. Section IV discusses the appeals judgments in the
Charles Taylor and the Nikola Šainović, et al. cases, both of
which explicitly rejected “specific direction” as an element of aiding and abetting, and argues that the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation of specific direction is overly stringent. Finally, Section
V concludes that the element of specific direction should either
be rejected or modified to include a “reasonable person” standard.
I. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIDING AND
ABETTING UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRIOR TO THE
FORMATION OF THE ICTY
After World War II, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the “Nuremberg Tribunal”) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal”) were established to prosecute crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.7 The Charters of both tribunals (the
“Nuremberg Charter” and the “Tokyo Charter,” respectively) explicitly provided for jurisdiction over individuals—specifically,
over “[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy . . . .”8 Subsequent tribunals established in occupied Germany created pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 also prosecuted the crimes set forth in the Nuremberg Charter, including
London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, arts. 1$2, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279; Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8,
1945, 85 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]; International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, arts. 1, 5, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1587 [hereinafter Tokyo Tribunal Charter].
8 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 7, art. 5; Tokyo Tribunal Charter, supra note
7, art. 1.
7
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abetting the commission of such crimes. Article II(2) of Control
Council Law No. 10 states as follows:
Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in
which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined
in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b)
was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered
or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d)
was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a) if he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of
its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in
the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country.9

In a number of cases, individuals were held responsible for aiding and abetting the commission of war crimes. One example is
the “Zyklon B Case.” Bruno Tesch was an owner of the firm of
Tesch & Stabenow (“T&S”), which specialized in using a gas
called Zyklon B for pest control.10 During World War II, T&S
sold Zyklon B to the Nazi Schutzstaffel (“the SS”).11 The British
Military Court in Hamburg, Germany, tried Tesch and two others for supplying Zyklon B to the SS while knowing that it would
be used to kill prisoners who were interned in Nazi operated concentration camps.12 The prosecution claimed that Tesch and the
others must have been aware of the large amounts of Zyklon B
being purchased by the SS and that such amounts were too large
for mere pest control.13 In early 1944, nearly two tons of Zyklon
B were being supplied to Auschwitz each month.14 The prosecution alleged that 4.5 million people were exterminated using
Zyklon B in Auschwitz alone.15 Tesch and one other defendant
were found guilty of selling the poison gas to the SS that was

Control Council, Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, art. II(2), Dec. 20, 1945 (emphasis added), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp.
10 The Zyklon B Case, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, Case No. 9, Judgment, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. 1, 93 (British Military
Court, Mar. 8, 1946) [hereinafter Zyklon B].
11 Id. at 94.
12 Id. at 93$94.
13 Id. at 101.
14 Id. at 94.
15 Id.
9
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used to exterminate human beings.16 They were each sentenced
to death.17
In another prosecution, Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirtynine others18 were tried by the General Military Court of the
United States Zone located in Dachau, Germany for “willfully,
deliberately, and wrongfully” aiding, abetting, and participating
in subjecting civilians and captured soldiers being held at the
Dachau Concentration Camp to “cruelties and mistreatments including killings, beatings and tortures, starvation, abuses and
indignities.”19 In order to make its case against the forty defendants, the prosecution needed to prove the following: “(1) that
there was in force at Dachau a system to ill-treat the prisoners
and commit the crimes listed in the charges, (2) that each accused was aware of the system, [and] (3) that each accused, by
his conduct ‘encouraged, aided and abetted or participated’ in
enforcing this system.”20 The Court found that the evidence and
testimony proved these three elements for each accused defendant, and all forty were convicted.21
While, for many years, there were no tribunals similar to those
at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and related military tribunals, individual
criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting continued to be
recognized under international law in numerous treaties and
other sources.22
Id. at 102.
Id.
18 Martin Gottfried Weiss was the highest ranking S.S. officer and acting Commandant of the Dachau concentration camp at the time that the camp was
liberated by the United States military in 1945. The other defendants included
doctors who conducted medical experiments at the camp and other camp officials, such as executioners. See Dachau Trials: US vs. Martin Gottfried Weiss,
et al, SCRAPBOOK PAGES (April 6, 2008), http://www.scrapbookpages.com/DachauScrapbook/DachauTrials/MartinGottfriedWeiss.html.
19 U.N. War Crimes Commission, Case No. 60, The Dachau Concentration
Camp Trial, Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-Nine Others, General
Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, Nov.
15-Dec. 13, 1945, in 11 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 5 (1997)
[hereinafter Dachau].
20 Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 8. For a comprehensive discussion of post-WW II case law on aiding
and abetting, see Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment (Special Court for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2012) (hereinafter Taylor Appeals Judgment) [hereinafter Tadić Appeals Judgment].
22 For example, the following all include individual responsibility for aiding
and abetting: (1) the 1950 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law
16
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II. ICTY’S CASE LAW REGARDING AIDING AND ABETTING
With this backdrop of international criminal law regarding
aiding and abetting, as well as domestic laws recognizing aiding
and abetting as a form of responsibility,23 the drafters of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia (“the ICTY Statute”) formulated individual criminal
responsibility to include aiding and abetting. Specifically, Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute states that: “[a] person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted
in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to

Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal; (2) the 1973 Convention
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (criminalizing
those who abet, encourage, or cooperate in the crime of apartheid); (3) the 1984
International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (directing state parties to criminalize all
acts of torture, attempts to commit torture, or “act[s] by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture”); and (4) the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (directing state parties to criminalize “[o]rganizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or
counseling the commission of serious crime involving an organized criminal
group”). See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by
the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946); International Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, art III, G.A. Res.
3068 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (July 18, 1974); Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 4,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. “Complicity” is analogous to aiding and abetting in this context; United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 5(1)(b), G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (Nov. 15, 2000),
available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC/.
23 For examples of articles discussing aiding and abetting domestically, internationally, and as applied by the ICTY, see Andrea Reggio, Aiding and Abetting
in International Criminal Law: The Responsibility of Corporate Agents and
Businessmen for “Trading With The Enemy” of Mankind, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
623 (2005); Sean Wilkins, Criminal Law – Accomplice Liability – A Defendant
Who Intends to Aid, Abet, Counsel, or Procure the Commission of a Crime, Is
Liable for that Crime as Well as the Natural and Probable Consequences of that
Crime – People v. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 2006), 85 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 69 (2007-2008); Adam Harris Kurland, To “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Command,
Induce, or Procure the Commission of an Offense”: A Critique of Federal Aiding
and Abetting Principles, 57 S.C. L. REV. 85 (2005-2006); Michael G. Karnavas,
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagoević, Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, (Jan. 17, 2005), 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 609 (2005); Chad G. Marzen, The
Furundzija Judgment and Its Continued Vitality in International Law, 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 505 (2009-2010).

178

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 40:1

in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”24
A. The Duško Tadić Case
The aiding and abetting standard was first interpreted by the
ICTY in the Duško Tadić case.25 The ICTY’s mandate states that
it is only authorized to apply international humanitarian law
that is “beyond any doubt customary law.”26 Therefore, in the
Tadić case, the ICTY was required to determine the customary
international law standard for aiding and abetting in order to
apply Article 7(1). The Trial Chamber considered, among other
things, the Paris Peace Conference that followed World War I
and the Treaty of Versailles, various war crimes trials that had
convicted individuals for aiding and abetting war crimes after
World War II, and various international conventions that called
for ratifying states to criminalize aiding and abetting numerous
international crimes.27 The Trial Chamber determined that
these sources established a “basis in customary international
law for both individual responsibility and for participation in the
various ways provided by Article 7 of the Statute.”28 The Court
therefore concluded that it had the authority to make findings
in the cases before it, including the Tadić case, pursuant to Article 7.1.29

Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 7(1), Sept. 2009, (emphasis added), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/
Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf.
A corollary provision exists in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
S.C. Res. 955, art. 6(1), Nov. 8, 1994, available at http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ictr_EF.pdf.
25 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 662 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). [hereinafter Tadić TC
Judgment].
26 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) and Annex Thereto, ¶ 34,
U.N. DOC. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). In the Furundzija and Rwamakuba cases,
the Tribunals have carried out the customary international law analysis for
modes of responsibility as well as substantive crimes—aiding and abetting in
the former case, joint criminal enterprise and genocide in the latter. See infra
Part II.B.
27 See, e.g., Part I.
28 Tadić TC Judgment, supra note 25, ¶¶ 663–69.
29 Id. ¶ 669.
24
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The indictment against Tadić charged him with thirty-four
counts and alleged that he “participated in the attack on, seizure, murder and maltreatment of Bosnian Muslims and Croats
in . . . Prijedor both within the [Omarska and Keraterm] camps
and outside the camps.”30 The Trial Chamber found Tadić guilty
or partially guilty on eleven counts of the indictment.31 On appeal, the Appellate Chamber found Tadić guilty on an additional
nine charges. 32
In Tadić, the ICTY Trial Chamber looked to various Nuremberg trial precedents to determine the standard for participation
in a crime, including responsibility for aiding and abetting.33 As
to the elements of criminal participation, the Trial Chamber
summarized the precedents as follows:
First, there is a requirement of intent, which involves awareness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a
crime. Second, the prosecution must prove that there was participation in that the conduct of the accused contributed to the
commission of the illegal act.34

Thus, the Trial Chamber held that, first, mens rea is required
to find an individual responsible for participating in a crime—
including the aiding and abetting of a crime.35 The Trial Chamber cited a British Military Court for the proposition that, if an
“accused took part with another man, with the knowledge that
the other man was going to kill, then [the accused] was as guilty
as the one doing the actual killing.”36 Thus, the Tadić Trial
Chamber held that the requisite intent for criminal responsibility could be satisfied by knowledge of the principal crime, meaning actual or assumed knowledge, along with participation. It
30

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Indictment (Amended), ¶ 1 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić Indictment].
31 Tadić TC Judgment, supra note 25, at 285–86.
32 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Summary of Appeals Chamber
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeals Judgment Summary].
33 Tadić TC Judgment, supra note 25, ¶¶ 664–69.
34 Id. ¶ 674 (emphasis added).
35 Id. ¶ 675.
36 Id. ¶ 674, (citing Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others, in 15 LAW REPORTS
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 51 (1997)).
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also held that knowledge “can be inferred from the circumstances.”37 The Tadić Court also clarified that this mens rea
standard does not require a “pre-arranged plan . . . to engage in
any specific conduct” to exist.38
As to the second element, actus reus, the Tadić Court held that
it must “directly affect the commission of the crime itself.”39 Direct contribution does not require the accused to physically participate in the commission of the act or be physically present
during its commission.40 Furthermore, “the connection between
the act contributing to the commission and the act of commission
itself can be geographically and temporally distanced.”41 The
Trial Chamber referred to the Zyklon B Case, which held that
only the following proof was necessary to hold the defendants
criminally responsible for aiding and abetting: “First, that Allied
nationals had been gassed by means of Zyklon B; secondly, that
this gas had been supplied by [the defendants]; and thirdly, that
the accused knew that the gas was to be used for the purpose of
killing human beings.”42
Finally, the Trial Chamber in Tadić discussed the amount of
assistance necessary to find an accused guilty of aiding and abetting. The Court stated that mere presence at the scene of the
crime is not enough. Rather, a “substantial contribution” was
necessary, and defined this as a “contribution that in fact has an
effect on the commission of the crime.”43 This means that, but
for the actions of the aider and abettor, the criminal act “most
probably would not have occurred in the same way.”44 For example, with respect to the Zyklon B Case, but for the sale of Zyklon
Tadić TC Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 676. The court based its finding on the
Mauthausen case. In Mauthausen, sixty-one defendants had worked at a concentration camp where detainees were murdered in gas chambers. The U.S.
Military Tribunal found that all sixty-one defendants had actual or inferred
knowledge of the crimes occurring at the camp because the state of the camp
“was of such a criminal nature as to cause every official, governmental, military and civil, and every employee thereof, whether he be a member of the
Waffen SS, Allgemeine SS, a guard, or civilian, to be culpably and criminally
responsible.” Id.
38 Tadić TC Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 677.
39 Id. ¶ 678.
40 Id. ¶ 679.
41 Id. ¶ 687.
42 Id. ¶ 680, citing Zyklon B, supra note 10, at 101.
43 Id. ¶ 688.
44 Id. ¶ 688.
37
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B by T&S to the SS, mass murder would more than likely not
have occurred via Zyklon B.45 The ICTY Trial Chamber went on
to state that “aiding and abetting includes all acts of assistance
by words or acts that lend encouragement or support, as long as
the requisite intent is present.”46
The ICTY Trial Chamber summarized its determination in the
Tadić case as to aiding and abetting as follows:
[T]he accused will be found criminally culpable for any conduct
where it is determined that he knowingly participated in the
commission of an offence that violates international humanitarian law and his participation directly and substantially affected the commission of that offence through supporting the
actual commission before, during, or after the incident. He will
also be responsible for all that naturally results from the commission of the act in question.47

Thus, there are two basic elements to the crime—knowing participation and substantial contribution.48
B. The Furundžija Case
In the Furundžija case, the ICTY Trial Chamber expanded on
what constitutes the actus reus of aiding and abetting.49 The
Court examined numerous cases, mostly post–World War II
precedents, and determined that “the assistance given by an accomplice need not be tangible and can consist of moral support
in certain circumstances.”50 Such assistance, however, must constitute more than mere observance of the act. To qualify as an
aider and abettor, the presence of the accomplice must have a
“significant legitimizing or encouraging act on the principals.”51
Regarding the effect of the assistance on the principal, the acts
Id.
Id. ¶ 689.
47 Id. ¶ 692, emphasis added.
48 For further discussion of ICTY case law on the aiding and abetting question,
see Jennifer Trahan, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A
Topical Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia 370–90 (2006) [hereinafter ICTY Digest], available at
http://www.hrw.org/ sites/default/files/reports/ictr0110webwcover.pdf.
49 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 192 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) [hereinafter
Furundžija TC Judgment].
50 Id. ¶ 232.
51 Id.
45

46
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of the accomplice do not need to have a causal relationship to the
acts of the principal.52 But, the acts of the accomplice must make
a “significant difference to the commission of the criminal act by
the principal.”53 In Furundžija, the Trial Chamber summarized
its holding by stating that “the actus reus of aiding and abetting
in international criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on
the perpetration of the crime.”54
In 1999, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić agreed with the
standard set forth by the Trial Chamber in cases such as Tadić
and Furundžija. In summarizing the standard, however, the Appeals Chamber stated that “[t]he aider and abettor carries out
acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime.”55 Notably, the Trial Chamber did not use
the phrase “specific direction.” On the contrary, the Appeals
Chamber’s decision is where the “specific direction” language is
first found in ICTY case law.56 Moreover, the Tadić Appeals
Chamber’s reference to “specific direction” was made while comparing aiding and abetting responsibility with joint criminal enterprise—and the Appeals Chamber provided no explanation of
any basis for “specific direction.” Thus, when the Tadić case discussed “specific direction,” it was merely descriptive and not considered to be an element of aiding and abetting.57
C. Other Relevant ICTY Cases
After Tadić, the phrase “specific direction” has been mentioned in numerous ICTY appellate judgments; however, as
Id. ¶ 233.
Id.
54 Id. ¶ 235. As a side note, the Appeals Chamber in the Furundžija case rejected each of Furundžija’s grounds for appeal, dismissed the appeal, affirmed
the convictions and sentences, and did not discuss or alter the Trial Chamber’s
aiding and abetting standard. See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-9517/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
55 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶
229(iii) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (emphasis
added).
56 Id.
57 See infra Section IV.B.2.
52

53
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Judge Liu notes in his Partially Dissenting Opinion to the
Perišić Appellate Judgment,58 “the cases cited by the [Perišić Appeals Chamber] as evidence of an established specific direction
requirement merely make mention of ‘acts directed at specific
crimes’ as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting
liability.”59 These cases simply restate the language used in the
58See

infra Section III.E.
v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
Judge Liu Dissent, ¶ 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28,
2013) [hereinafter Perišić Appeals Judgment, Judge Liu Dissent]. The following ICTY and ICTR appellate judgments are cited by the Perišić Appeals
Chamber as requiring “specific direction” as an element of the actus reus, but
are in fact simply reciting the phrase without defining or applying it: Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 89
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 45 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case
No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 33 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 254 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Kupreškić Appeals Judgment] (It should be noted
that the Lieu Dissent refers to the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s majority’s reference to paragraph 254 of the Kupreškić Appeals Judgment. However, in note
103 of the majority opinion, the majority references paragraphs 275-77 of the
Kupreškić Appeals Judgment, which it states finds that “a six-month delay
between an appellant being observed unloading weapons and a subsequent attack reduced the likelihood that these weapons were directed towards assisting
in this attack.” Arguably, this might signify that the Kupreškić Appeals Judgment found that aiding and abetting could not be proven because there was
insufficient specific direction due to significant temporal distance between actions.); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 163 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000);
Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 74 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 20, 2010); Muvunyi v. Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 79 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda April 1, 2011); Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-200166-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 139 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar.
12, 2008); Nahimana, et al. v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 482 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007); Muhimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶ 189 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 21, 2007); Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et
al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 370 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda July 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and
Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-17-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 530
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda July 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Simić, et al., Case No.
59Prosecutor
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Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment without defining the meaning, without elucidating the parameters or application of the
standard, and without applying it to the facts of the given case.60
Furthermore, several cases have disavowed the standard or
simply not applied it when adjudicating aiding and abetting responsibility.61
For instance, in Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber revisited the “specific direction” language
used by the Appeals Chamber in Tadić.62 In Blagojević and
Jokić, defendant Jokić argued that the Appeals Chamber had
“included specific direction as a required legal element in defining the actus reus of aiding and abetting and . . . has not since
departed from this definition.”63 In response, the Appeals Chamber first noted that the “specific direction” language was used in
a section of the Tadić Appeals Judgment in which the Court was
“distinguishing aiding and abetting from acting in pursuit of a
common purpose or design to commit a crime” because in the
latter instance, the alleged participant performs acts that are
only “in some way directed” to furthering the common plan or
purpose.64 The Appeals Chamber then examined several cases
that quoted the Tadić Appeals Chamber standard and concluded
as follows:
While the Tadić definition has not been explicitly departed
from, specific direction has not always been included as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting. This may be explained by the fact that such a finding will often be implicit in
the finding that the accused has provided practical assistance
IT-95-9-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 85 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 28, 2006); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3,
2008); Ntawukulilyayo v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-82-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 214 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Dec. 14, 2011);
Rukundo v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 20, 2010); Karera v. The
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-74-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 321 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 2, 2009).
60 Perišić Appeals Judgment, Liu Dissent, supra, note 59; but see Kupreškić
Appeals Judgment, supra, note 59.
61 Id.
62 Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007) [hereinafter Blagojević and Jokić Appeals Judgment].
63 Id. ¶ 184 (italics omitted).
64 Id. ¶ 185.
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to the principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on
the commission of the crime.65

Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Mrškić, et al., defendant
Šljivančanin asserted that specific direction to assist, encourage,
or lend moral support is required, and that mere knowledge that
certain actions facilitate the commission of crimes by the principal actor is not sufficient.66 The Appeals Chamber noted that
Šljivančanin was incorrectly conflating the mens rea and actus
reus standards for aiding and abetting.67 In addition, the Appeals Chamber then stated that it “has confirmed that ‘specific
direction’ is not an essential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.”68 The Appeals Chamber in Lukić & Lukić,
cited and concurred with the discussions rejecting specific direction as an element in the Blagojević and Jokić, and Mrškić, et al.
appeals judgments.69
Thus, while the issue of “specific direction” is not new, having
first been mentioned in Tadić and later cases, the Appeals
Chamber in Blagojević and Jokić, Mrškić, et al., and Lukić &
Lukić concluded that it is not an essential element of aiding and
abetting.70
III. THE MOM)ILO PERIŠI* CASE
The ICTY Appeals Chamber’s approach to whether specific direction is an element of aiding and abetting dramatically
changed with the controversial 2013 holding in Prosecutor v.
Perišić, which found that aiding and abetting requires specific
direction.71

Id. ¶ 189 (emphasis added).
Prosecutor v. Mrškić, et al., Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 157 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009) [hereinafter Mrškić Appeals Judgment].
67 Id.
68 Mrškić Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶ 159 (citing Blagojević and Jokić
Appeals Judgment, supra note 62, ¶¶ 188–89 (emphasis added)).
69 Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 424 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Lukić Appeals Judgment].
70 Blagojević and Jokić Appeals Judgment, supra note 62, ¶ 189; Mrškić Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶ 159; Lukić Appeals Judgment, supra note
71, ¶ 424.
71 Perišić Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, ¶ 30.

65
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A. The Perišić Indictment
Momčilo Perišić, as Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff
from 1993 to 1998, was the top military officer of the Yugoslav
Army (“VJ”), headquartered in Belgrade, Serbia.72 According to
the Second Amended Indictment, Perišić’s position gave him authority to
(1) make and implement decisions for the VJ General Staff and
all subordinate units; (2) issue orders, instructions, [and] directives [and to ensure their implementation]; and (3) transfer
and second VJ personnel to Army of the Republic of Srpska and
the Army of the Serbian Krajina [(the “SVK”)] . . . .73

The Perišić Indictment set forth a lengthy discussion of
Perišić’s significant involvement with and assistance to the
VRS.74 The indictment alleged that in early 1995, Radovan
Karadžić, the former President of Republika Srpska and Supreme Commander of the VRS, directed the VRS to “eliminate
the Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa.”75 The indictment
further alleged that Perišić knew that the attack was planned,
and also knew that some VRS members would commit criminal
acts including persecution, forcible transfers, and killings.76 In
July 1995, according to the indictment, over 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed by VRS forces in the areas surrounding the town of Srebrenica in the worst act of genocide to
occur in Europe since World War II.77 Many of the victims were
Perišić TC Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 2; Perišić TC Judgment Summary,
supra note 2, at 1.
73 Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81, Second Amended Indictment, ¶ 3
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Perišić
Indictment].
74 Id. ¶¶ 10–39.
75 Id. ¶ 56.
76 Id.
77 Id. ¶¶ 57, 61. A more accurate figure is over 8,000. Maja Zuvela, Bosnia Reburies Srebrenica Dead 18 Years After Massacre, REUTERS (July 11, 2013, 10:44
AM, EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/11/us-bosnia-srebrenicaidUSBRE96A0HJ20130711. Perišić was not the only person to be tried for
criminal responsibility related to the Srebrenica massacre; Ratko Mladić and
Radovan Karadzić currently also stand accused of genocide at Srebrenica and
elsewhere. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appellate Judgment, Disposition, ¶ 39 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19,
2004) (wherein the ICTY Appeals Chamber unanimously found that “genocide
was committed at Srebrenica in 1995” and that Krstić was “guilty of aiding and
abetting genocide”).
72
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buried in mass graves.78 In addition, over 25,000 Bosnian Muslims were forcibly transferred from Srebrenica and surrounding
areas.79 After the mass executions, VRS units exhumed bodies
from the mass graves and reburied them in an attempt to conceal the killings.80 The indictment charged Perišić with aiding
and abetting these unlawful killings, inhumane acts, and forcible transfers.81 Perišić was also charged with aiding and abetting the planning, preparation, or execution of shelling and sniping of civilian areas in Sarajevo, resulting in the wounding and
deaths of thousands of civilians.82 He was additionally charged
with planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise
aiding and abetting the shelling of civilian areas in the city of
Zagreb by the SVK.83
B. The Perišić Trial Chamber Judgment and Opinion Related
to Aiding and Abetting
The Trial Chamber stated that, to find Perišić guilty for aiding
and abetting, it would need to find that Perišić: (1) provided
“practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to the
principal perpetrator of the crime which had a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime;” (2) knew his acts would assist
the principal; and (3) was aware of elements of the crime, including the principal’s state of mind.84 The Trial Chamber stated
that specific direction is not a required element of the actus reus
for criminal aiding and abetting responsibility.85 Rather, the element of substantial assistance may be proven by other forms of
practical assistance.86 The Trial Chamber majority opinion held
that there is no requirement: (1) for a cause and effect relationship between aiding and abetting and the commission of crimes;

Id. ¶ 57.
Id. ¶ 61.
80 Id. ¶ 57.
81 Id. ¶ 60.
82 Perišić Indictment, supra note 73, ¶ 40.
83 Id. ¶ 47.
84 Perišić TC Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 1580.
85 Id. ¶ 1624, citing Mrškić Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶ 159; Blagojević
and Jokić Appeals Judgment, supra note 62, ¶¶ 192, 195.
86 Perišić TC Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 1580.
78

79
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(2) that the aider and abettor’s actions were a condition precedent to the commission of crimes; or (3) that the aider and abettor’s actions were the cause sine qua non of the crimes.87
On September 6, 2011, after a trial lasting over three years in
which over 100 witnesses testified and 3,794 documents were
presented to the Court, the Trial Chamber convicted Perišić,
with Judge Moloto dissenting.88 The Trial Chamber issued a 573
page Judgment and Opinion, in which it found that both the actus reus and mens rea standards for criminal aiding and abetting responsibility had been met and found Perišić guilty of all
aiding and abetting charges except for Count 13 (“extermination
[in Srebrenica] as a crime against humanity pursuant to Articles
7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute”).89 He was also found guilty of four
charges and acquitted of eight charges for acting as a superior
and failing to punish his subordinates.90 He was sentenced to
twenty-seven years of imprisonment.91
Specifically, the Trial Chamber found that the VRS’s strategy
involved no distinction between warfare against opposing forces
and crimes against civilians.92 It found that the VRS’s crimes
were “inextricably linked to the war strategies and objectives of
the VRS leadership,”93 and that Perišić continued the policy of
the VJ regarding assistance to the VRS that existed before he
was elevated to Chief of the VJ General Staff by providing “comprehensive military assistance” to the VRS.94 The Trial Chamber concluded that the evidence demonstrated that, without VJ
support, the VRS would not have been able to engage in the activities that it did.95 Karadžić stated that “nothing would happen
without Serbia. We do not have those resources and we would
not be able to fight.”96 The Trial Chamber also found that the
evidence showed that the VRS depended heavily on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and VJ logistical and personnel assistance
in order to wage war.97 The Trial Chamber thus concluded that
Id. ¶ 1580.
Perišić TC Judgment Summary, supra note 2, at 1.
89 Perišić TC Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1836, 1838.
90 Id. ¶¶ 1837, 1839.
91 Id. ¶ 1840.
92 Id. ¶ 1588.
93 Id.
94 Id. ¶ 1594–95.
95 Id. ¶ 1597.
96 Id. ¶ 1598.
97 Id. ¶¶ 1602, 1619.

87
88
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Perišić’s logistical and personnel assistance to the perpetrators
of the crimes had a substantial effect on the VRS’s perpetration
of crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, and that, because he was
provided with information from multiple sources of the “VRS’s
criminal behaviour and discriminatory intent” and provided substantial assistance with this state of mind, he knowingly contributed to the crimes.98
C. Judge Moloto’s Dissent Related to Aiding and Abetting
Judge Moloto, the lone dissenter from the Trial Chamber’s majority opinion in Perišić, stated that:
[P]roviding assistance to the VRS to wage war cannot and
should not be equated with aiding and abetting the crimes committed during such war. The provision of assistance by Perišić
to the VRS is too remote from the crimes committed during the
war to qualify as aiding and abetting such crimes. To conclude
otherwise, as the Majority has done, is to criminalise the waging of war, which is not a crime according to the Statute of the
Tribunal. In addition, it raises the question: where is the cutoff line?99

Judge Moloto stated that, even though the VRS was largely dependent upon the assistance of the VJ to function, that does not
mean that the assistance had a substantial effect on the commission of crimes.100 He went on to argue that the majority was conflating the requirements of aiding and abetting with those of
joint criminal enterprise.101
Judge Moloto specifically disagreed with the Trial Chamber
majority’s conclusion that specific direction is not a required element for criminal aiding and abetting responsibility.102 He
stated that the notion of specific direction was “consistently
cited” by the ICTY when defining aiding and abetting.103 Judge
Moloto argued that a “direct link needs to be established between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the commission

Id. ¶¶ 1627, 1631.
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81, Trial Chamber Judgment, Moloto
Dissent, ¶ 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Perišić TC Judgment, Moloto Dissent].
100 Id. ¶ 4.
101 Id. ¶ 5.
102 Id. ¶ 9.
103 Id.
98
99
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of the crimes,” and that in cases where an alleged aider and abettor is remote from the crime scene, “specific direction must form
an integral and explicit component of the objective element of
aiding and abetting.”104 With respect to Perišić, Judge Moloto
maintained that the direct evidence presented did not demonstrate the existence of such a link, and that circumstantial evidence was not sufficient because more than one reasonable conclusion could be drawn from the evidence.105 In conclusion,
Judge Moloto stated as follows:
If we are to accept the Majority’s conclusion based solely on the
finding of dependence, as it is in casu, without requiring that
such assistance be specifically directed to the assistance of
crimes, then all military and political leaders, who on the basis
of circumstantial evidence are found to provide logistical assistance to a foreign army dependent on such assistance, can meet
the objective element of aiding and abetting. I respectfully hold
that such an approach is manifestly inconsistent with the
law.106

D. The Perišić Appeals Chamber Judgment Related to Aiding
and Abetting
On appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Judgment, the Appeals
Chamber noted that it first set the standard for criminal aiding
and abetting responsibility in Tadić.107 As noted above, in that
case, the Appeals Chamber had distinguished aiding and abetting from a joint criminal enterprise by stating that the actus
reus of aiding and abetting requires that acts be specifically directed toward assisting the crime, whereas the actus reus of joint
criminal enterprise requires that acts be directed toward assistance “in some way.”108 The Perišić Appeals Chamber went on to
state that it had not departed from that definition, and that the
ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
106 Id. ¶ 33.
107 Perišić Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, ¶ 26.
108 Id. ¶¶ 26–27.
104

105
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(“ICTR”) had explicitly referred to specific direction in subsequent judgments.109
With respect to several judgments that did not explicitly refer
to specific direction, the Perišić Appeals Chamber explained that
those cases (1) employed equivalent standards,110 (2) did not discuss aiding and abetting responsibility—including specific direction—comprehensively, or (3) cited to previous judgments which
had discussed specific direction.111 The Appeals Chamber then
confronted the language in the Mrškić and Šljivančanin Appeals
Judgment that explicitly stated that specific direction was not
required for the aiding and abetting actus reus. The Appeals
Chamber stated that: (1) this statement was contained in a section discussing the requisite mens rea element, not actus reus;
(2) the authority cited to support the statement was in the Blagojević and Jokić Appeals Judgment, which holds that specific direction is required;112 and 3) it is the practice of the Appeals
Chamber to only depart from previously settled standards when
careful consideration is given, and the passing reference to specific direction in the Mrškić and Šljivančanin judgment did not
amount to careful consideration.113 The Appeals Chamber thus
concluded that there was never an intention or attempt to depart
from the “settled precedent” that specific direction is a required
element of the aiding and abetting actus reus.114
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber held that, where an alleged aider and abettor commits acts that are “geographically or
otherwise proximate” to the crimes in question, specific direction
may not need to be addressed explicitly because it can be demonstrated by discussion of other elements, such as substantial contribution.115 In cases where the alleged aider and abettor is remote from the crimes at issue, however, specific direction must

Id. ¶ 28. For further discussion of the ICTR’s discussion of aiding and abetting law, see Jennifer Trahan, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda 202–23 (Human Rights Watch 2010).
110 Id. ¶ 29.
111 Id. ¶ 30.
112 It should be noted that the Blagojević and Jokić Appeals Judgment also
states that specific direction may be satisfied implicitly through a substantial
contribution analysis.
113 Id. ¶ 34.
114 Id. ¶ 35–36.
115 Id. ¶ 38.
109
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be explicitly considered.116 The Appeals Chamber did not identify factors that would determine sufficient remoteness to require explicit consideration of specific direction, but instead
stated that such a determination would be case specific and factors such as significant geographical or temporal distance might
be relevant.117
Regarding the Perišić case, specifically, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that Perišić’s alleged assistance to the VRS was remote from the crimes because (1) the VRS and VJ were independent from one another, (2) the two armies were in separate
regions, and (3) no evidence was presented that Perišić was ever
physically present when crimes were planned or committed.118
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber determined that significant remoteness existed to trigger the requirement for an explicit discussion of specific direction.119 Since such an examination was
not conducted by the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber determined that it was required to assess the evidence de novo.120
In connection with its review, the Appeals Chamber first noted
that previous judgments had not clarified what types of evidence
might prove specific direction, and thus the evidence would be
case specific.121 The Appeals Chamber did find that general assistance that “could be used for both lawful and unlawful activities” would not be sufficient by itself.122 In such cases, evidence
demonstrating a direct link between aid and crimes would be
necessary.123 On de novo review, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the VJ policy to provide assistance to the VRS was
adopted by the Supreme Defense Council (the “SDC”) of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (the “SRY”) before Perišić was appointed to the Chief position, and that the SDC retained and exercised power to review this policy and any requests for aid by
the VRS.124 The Appeals Chamber then conducted inquiries into
whether the VRS’s exclusive purpose was to commit crimes and

Id. ¶ 39.
Id. ¶ 40.
118 Id. ¶ 42.
119 Id.
120 Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
121 Id. ¶ 42.
122 Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
123 Id. ¶ 44.
124 Id. ¶ 50.
116

117
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whether the SDC’s VRS assistance policy endorsed assisting the
VRS’s crimes.125
Regarding the first inquiry, the Appeals Chamber noted that
the Trial Chamber did not find that the VRS was a criminal organization.126 The Appeals Chamber then noted that, although
the Trial Chamber found that the VRS’s strategy was inextricably intertwined with crimes against civilians, the Trial Chamber
did not determine that all VRS activities were criminal in nature.127 Thus, the Appeals Chamber concluded that since the
VRS was not proven to be a criminal operation, the VJ’s policy
of assistance to the VRS did not show specific direction to assist
crimes.128
Regarding the second inquiry, the Appeals Chamber stated
that the Trial Chamber did not identify evidence demonstrating
that the SDC policy “directed aid towards VRS criminal activities in particular,” and the Appeals Chamber’s de novo review of
the evidence did not find any such evidence.129 The Appeals
Chamber stated further that the “volume of assistance” does not
necessarily prove specific direction.130 Specifically, in the Perišić
case, the Appeals Chamber stated that the evidence showing
Perišić’s volume of assistance was circumstantial.131 In order to
utilize circumstantial evidence to prove specific direction, the
Court stated that specific direction must be the “sole reasonable
evidence” after reviewing all of the evidence.132 Based upon the
results of these two inquiries, the Appeals Chamber concluded
that the “aid Perišić facilitated was not proved to be specifically
directed towards the VRS’s criminal activities.”133
The Appeals Chamber then considered whether Perišić implemented the SDC policy in a way that redirected aid toward VRS
crimes or took outside actions that redirected aid in such a
way.134 The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber
found evidence demonstrating that Perišić supported the SDC
Id. ¶ 52.
Id. ¶ 53.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. ¶¶ 54–55.
130 Id. ¶ 56.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. ¶ 58.
134 Id. ¶ 59.
125

126
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assistance policy.135 The Trial Chamber, however, did not identify any evidence showing that Perišić specifically directed aid
toward VRS criminal activities or supported such direction.136
The Appeals Chamber also considered whether the “nature
and distribution of VJ aid” could provide specific direction circumstantial evidence.137 Regarding secondment of personnel to
the VRS, the Appeals Chamber did not locate any evidence indicating that the policy of secondment was specifically to facilitate
the criminal acts of the VRS.138 The Court stated that the fact
that certain VJ soldiers who were seconded to the VRS committed crimes was not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate specific
direction.139 With respect to logistical aid, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that the aid provided to the VRS by the VJ did not
“appear incompatible with lawful military operations.”140 Finally, the Appeals Chamber did not find evidence showing that
(1) Perišić delivered aid in his role as Chief of the General Staff
in a way that directed it toward VRS crimes, even though he may
have known about such crimes, or that (2) Perišić delivered such
directed aid outside his role as Chief of the General Staff.141
Accordingly, based upon a review of the evidence and its finding that no specific direction was proven to exist, the Appeals
Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s Judgment and acquitted
Perišić on all counts.142
E. Judge Liu’s Partial Dissent Regarding Aiding and Abetting
Judge Liu challenged the Appeals Chamber’s conclusion that
specific direction is required. Judge Liu stated that, while specific direction has been mentioned in ICTY cases, it has not been
consistently applied.143 He noted that, in the cases where specific direction was mentioned, the Appeals Chamber simply
Id. ¶ 60.
Id. ¶¶ 60–61.
137 Id. ¶ 62.
138 Id. ¶ 63.
139 Id.
140 Id. ¶ 65.
141 Id. ¶¶ 66–69.
142 Id. ¶¶ 70–74, 120, and 122. The Trial Chamber judgment regarding all
charges against Perišić was reversed—both aiding and abetting and superior
responsibility—and Perišić was completely acquitted. An analysis of the Appeals Chamber’s discussion of superior responsibility is outside the scope of
this article.
143 Perišić Appeals Judgment, Judge Liu Dissent, supra note 59, ¶ 2.
135

136
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quoted the language from Tadić without actually applying the
specific direction requirements to the facts.144 Furthermore,
Judge Liu stated that ICTY cases indicate that aiding and abetting responsibility may be established without proof of specific
direction.145 As such, Judge Liu found that insisting on a specific
direction requirement “effectively raises the threshold for aiding
and abetting responsibility” and would undermine “the very purpose of aiding and abetting responsibility by allowing those responsible for knowingly facilitating the most grievous crimes to
evade responsibility for their acts.”146
Judge Liu also evaluated the evidence considered by the Trial
Chamber and the Trial Chamber’s analysis thereof.147 Judge Liu
reiterated that the Trial Chamber concluded that: (1) Perišić
was responsible for assisting the VRS’s criminal acts;148 (2) the
VRS’s war strategy and criminal acts were “inextricably
linked”;149 (3) Perišić’s role went beyond merely providing logistical assistance in that he “recurrently encouraged” the SDC to
maintain assistance;150 (4) Perišić presided over a “system
providing comprehensive military assistance to the VRS” which
“sustained the very life line of the VRS and created the conditions for it to implement a war strategy that encompassed the
commission of crimes against civilians”;151 and (5) Perišić was
aware of the VRS’s crimes, and its propensity to commit more,
and yet continued to provide assistance in spite of this
knowledge.152 Judge Liu therefore concluded that the Trial
Chamber “did not err in its assessment of the evidence on the
record or in its analysis of aiding and abetting liability.”153

Id.; but see Kupreškić Appeals Judgment, supra note 59.
Id. ¶ 2 (citing Mrškić Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶ 159; Lukić Appeals Judgment, supra note 69, ¶ 424).
146 Id.
147 Id. ¶¶ 4$8.
148 Id. ¶ 4.
149 Id.
150 Id. ¶ 5.
151 Id. ¶¶ 6$7.
152 Id. ¶ 8.
153 Id. ¶ 9.
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IV. THE PERIŠIĆ APPEALS CHAMBER’S INTERPRETATION OF
“SPECIFIC DIRECTION” IS OVERLY STRINGENT AND HAS BEEN
REJECTED BY SUBSEQUENT ICTY AND SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE APPEALS CHAMBER DECISIONS
A. The Perišić Appeals Chamber’s Interpretation of “Specific Direction” Is So Stringent That It Potentially Eviscerates Aiding
and Abetting Under International Criminal Law
The Perišić Appeals Chamber’s determination that specific direction is a required element ends up establishing a standard so
stringent that it is difficult to imagine a scenario where it could
be met. As mentioned above, the Appeals Chamber conducted
inquiries into whether the VRS’s exclusive purpose was to commit crimes and whether the SDC’s VRS assistance policy endorsed assisting the VRS’s crimes.154 Yet, rarely would military
units be devoted exclusively to committing crimes. Even the
most notorious of paramilitary groups active in the Balkans conflict, such as Arkan’s Tigers, participated in some arguably legitimate military activities. If aiding and abetting is limited to
scenarios where a military’s or paramilitary’s exclusive purpose
is to commit crimes, it will be effectively eviscerated. Alternatively, the Perišić Appeals Chamber required that aid be specifically directed toward criminal activities in order to qualify as
aiding and abetting.155 This interpretation is also too stringent.
A provider could have knowledge of crimes being committed by
a recipient and choose to do nothing, or even encourage the recipient to continue the behavior, as opposed to initially specifically directing provisions toward the recipient’s criminal activities. The Appeals Chamber discounted evidence submitted to,
and analyzed by, the Trial Chamber that would have, at least,
proven that the assistance policy endorsed the VRS’s crimes,
such as: (1) the VRS’s war strategy and criminal acts were “inextricably linked”;156 (2) Perišić knew of the VRS’s criminal acts
and propensity to continue committing such acts;157 (3) in spite
of that knowledge, Perišić encouraged the SDC multiple times to
continue assistance when SDC officials questioned the policy;158
Perišić Appeals Judgment, supra note 5, ¶ 52.
Id.
156 Perišić Appeals Judgment, Judge Liu Dissent, supra note 61, ¶ 4.
157 Id. ¶ 8.
158 Id. ¶ 5.
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and (4) but for the provision of aid, the VRS could not have carried out its strategic objectives.159 The Appeals Chamber’s determination that these factors did not rise to the level of aiding
and abetting begs the question as to what actions would meet
such a high bar.
The Perišić Appeals Chamber’s “specific direction” requirement led the ICTY to acquit Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, despite seemingly strong evidence of criminal responsibility. In the Stanišić and Simatović Trial Chamber Judgment, released after the Perišić Appeals Chamber decision, the Court examines a conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Jovica
Stanišić where they discussed how Serbs and Croats might resolve the issues between them.160 Stanišić said: “With killings.”161 He then continued: “No. We’ll then have to push them
to go to Belgrade, you know! . . . There is nothing else left for us
to do. . . . Or we’ll exterminate them completely so let’s see where
we’ll end up.”162 Karadzic agreed with this statement and
Stanišić then stated: “No, if they want it, they’ll have it. Then
they’ll have an all-out war. . . . Better do it like decent people.”163
The Stanišić and Simatović Court evaluated, based on this and
other evidence, whether or not the defendants were guilty of aiding and abetting, and, after stating that specific direction was
part of the standard, determined that Stanišić and Simatović
were not guilty.164 Thus, even in a case where there was evidence
that the defendant suggested that problems would be resolved
by completely exterminating the opposing side, the Court still
found that this was “too vague” to be considered intent to aid and
abet crimes such as murder and forcible displacement committed as persecution.165
Interestingly, Judge Meron, President of the ICTY, posed the
following hypothetical to the prosecution during the Perišić appeals hearing:

Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment – Vol. II of II, ¶ 2307 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
May 30, 3013) [hereinafter Stanišić and Simatović TC Judgment].
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. ¶¶ 1264, 2356–61.
165 Id. ¶¶ 2309, 2356–61.
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Now, assume that the military aid supplied by country [A to
country B] is 100 percent . . . . So we don’t have to worry about
the origin of the munition[s]. Assume that it . . . comprises the
entire supply. The country supplies[,] therefore[,] the entire
military aid to a warring party in the neighbouring country B.
In the neighbouring country B[,] there is a war going on and
the recipient engages both in lawful military activities but also
in large-scale shelling of civilian towns. Would[,] without
more[,] the Chief of Staff of country A be criminally liable?166

Thus, it appears that one or more judges
Chamber may have been considering larger
example, how aiding and abetting without
might have an impact on military assistance
to another.167

in the Appellate
implications—for
specific direction
from one country

B. Appellate Chambers That Have Considered the Standard for
Aiding and Abetting After Perišić Have Rejected “Specific Direction” as an Element
1. The Charles Taylor Case
By contrast, the Appeals Chamber for the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL Appeals Chamber”) not long thereafter issued a judgment in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor rejecting “specific direction” as an element of aiding and abetting.168 The SCSL
Appeals Chamber held that while it is “guided by the decisions
of the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber . . . as well [as] . . . the
decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the [Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia] and the [Special Tribunal for
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Transcript of Appeals Chamber
Hearing, p. 62, ll. 5–12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 30,
2012) [hereinafter Perišić Appeals Hearing Transcript]. In a controversial letter, Judge Harhoff accused Judge Meron of pressuring other judges on the appellate panel to change the aiding and abetting standard. See Letter from
Judge Frederik Harhoff, ICTY (June 6, 2013), http://www.bt.dk/sites/default/files-dk/node-files/511/6/6511917-letter-english.pdf; see also Marlise Simons, International Judge is Removed from Case Over Apparent Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013, at A15. Judge Harhoff has since come under criticism for
writing the letter in the first place. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The Real Judge
Meron Scandal at the ICTY, OPINIO JURIS (June 17, 2013, 9:58 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/17/the-real-judge-meron-scandal-at-the-icty/. Judge Harhoff resigned from the ICTY.
167 Perišić Appeals Hearing Transcript, p. 62, ll. 5–12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 30, 2012).
168 Taylor Appeals Judgment, supra note 21.

166

2014]

AIDING AND ABETTING IN ICTY

199

Lebanon],” that it is the “final arbiter for the law for this Court,
and the decisions of other courts are only persuasive, not binding, authority.”169 The SCSL Appeals Chamber conducted a very
thorough review of post–World War II jurisprudence on aiding
and abetting, the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind,170 state practice, and the Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone.171 The Appeals Chamber determined that none of these sources required an actus reus element
of “specific direction.”172 The SCSL Appeals Chamber thus found
that
the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability under Article 6(1)
of the Statute and customary international law is that an accused’s acts and conduct of assistance, encouragement and/or
moral support had a substantial effect on the commission of
each charged crime for which he is to be held responsible.173

The SCSL Appeals Chamber noted that, even though the
Perišić Appeals Chamber stated that it was not departing from
prior ICTY precedent regarding specific direction, the “ICTY Appeals Chamber’s jurisprudence does not contain a clear, detailed
analysis of the authorities supporting the conclusion that ‘specific direction’ is an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability under customary international law.”174 The SCSL
Appeals Chamber also rejected the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s
determination that geographical proximity to the crime at issue
can be a deciding factor.175 The SCSL Appeals Chamber held
that “[w]hile an accused may be physically distant from the commission of the crime, he may in fact be in proximity to and interact with those ordering and directing the commission of
crimes.”176

Id. ¶ 472.
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind (1996), http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1996.pdf.
171 Taylor Appeals Judgment, supra note 21, ¶¶ 417–37.
172 Id. ¶¶ 473–74.
173 Id. ¶ 475.
174 Id. ¶ 477.
175 Id. ¶ 480.
176 Id.
169
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Justice Shireen Avis Fisher submitted a Concurring Opinion
on Aiding and Abetting Liability to the SCSL Appeals Chamber’s Judgment in Taylor.177 In addition to concurring with the
majority’s decision, Justice Fisher noted that the defense’s argument that the aiding and abetting standard was “so broad that
it would in fact encompass actions that are . . . carried out by a
great many States in relation to their assistance to rebel groups
or to governments that are well known to be engaging in crimes
of varying degrees of frequency . . . .”178 She further noted the
defense argument that such assistance “is going on in many
other countries that are supported in some cases by the very
sponsors of this Court” was very troublesome.179 Justice Fisher
concluded that the suggestion that the SCSL would “change the
law or fashion or decisions in the interests of States that provide
support for this or any international court is an affront to international criminal law and the judges who serve it.”180 Justice
Fisher went on to state that judges “do not decide hypothetical
cases,” but instead “look to the individual case before them and
apply the law as they are convinced it exists to the facts that
have been reasonably found.”181
2. The Šainović, et al. Case
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Šainović, et al.
also held that specific direction was not an element of aiding and
abetting.182 The Šainović ICTY Trial Chamber convicted one of
the defendants, Vladimir Lazarević, the Commander of the
Priština Corps of the VJ, of aiding and abetting the crimes of
deportation and forcible transfer of Albanians in Kosovo committed by the VJ in 1999.183 On appeal, Lazarević argued that the
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03—01-A, Appellate Judgment Concurrence (Special Court for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor
Appellate Judgment Concurrence].
178 Id. ¶ 716.
179 Id. ¶ 717.
180 Id. ¶ 716.
181 Id. ¶ 717.
182 Prosecutor v. Šainović, et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 1650–51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014)
[hereinafter Šainović Appeals Judgment].
183 Prosecutor v. Šainović, et al., Case No. IT-05-87, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 8, 921-31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Šainović TC Judgment]. It should be noted that another accused in this
case, Dragoljub Ojdanić, was also convicted of aiding and abetting; he dropped
177
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ICTY Trial Chamber failed to determine whether or not his actions were specifically directed to assist in the deportation and
forcible transfer, for which he was accused of aiding and abetting, and cited to the Perišić ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision
regarding specific direction.184 The Šainović ICTY Appeals
Chamber held that the Perišić Appellate Judgment contradicted
the “plain reading” of the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appellate
Judgment, which found that specific direction is not a required
element of aiding and abetting, and the Lukić and Lukić Appellate Judgment, which concurred with the Mrkšić and
Šljivančanin Appellate Judgment.185
The Šainović ICTY Appeals Chamber determined that due to
the conflicting opinions, it was obliged to determine which precedent to follow.186 It found that the Tadić Appellate Judgment
focused on joint criminal enterprise and did not engage in a thorough analysis of aiding and abetting and that the Perišić ICTY
Appeals Chamber relied upon the “flawed premise that the
Tadić Appeal Judgment established a precedent with respect to
specific direction.”187 Moreover, while some ICTY Appeals
Chamber decisions have repeated the Tadić language regarding
specific direction verbatim, others have not mentioned it as an
element—or have even rejected it outright.188 The Šainović ICTY
Appeals Chamber also reviewed post–World War II cases and
international instruments and found that none required a specific direction element.189 As such, the Šainović ICTY Appeals
Chamber determined that it would follow the Mrkšić and
Šljivančanin and Lukić and Lukić precedents, as opposed to the
Perišić precedent, and found that specific direction is not a required element of the aiding and abetting actus reus.190

his appeal, however, and the Office of the Prosecutor dropped its appeal
against some of his acquittals prior to the appeals hearing.
184 Šainović Appeals Judgment, supra note 182, ¶ 1617.
185 Id. ¶ 1621.
186 Id. ¶ 1622.
187 Id. ¶ 1623.
188 Id. ¶¶ 1623–26.
189 Id. ¶¶ 1627–42, 1647–49.
190 Id. ¶¶ 1650–51.
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V. THE ELEMENT OF SPECIFIC DIRECTION SHOULD EITHER BE
REJECTED OR MODIFIED TO EXPLICITLY INCLUDE A
“REASONABLE PERSON” STANDARD
This article suggests that tribunals in the future either follow
the precedents set in Charles Taylor and Šainović, wherein “specific direction” is rejected as a required element of an aiding and
abetting actus reus, or explicitly incorporate a “reasonable person” standard into the aiding and abetting criteria.
A. The Arguments for Rejecting “Specific Direction” as an Element of Aiding and Abetting
As the above discussion of the evolution of the international
criminal law standard for aiding and abetting demonstrates,
“specific direction” has often been mentioned in passing, but has
not been a required element of the aiding and abetting actus
reus.
In the excerpted post–World War II tribunal cases, not only is
“specific direction” not required, it is not mentioned. In the
Zyklon B Case, the evidence demonstrated that T&S contracted
to sell Zyklon B to the Nazi SS for its intended purpose—extermination of vermin such as lice and rats.191 The prosecution argued that later in the sales relationship, Tesch and others became aware that the SS was using the product to exterminate
humans, which was not its intended purpose and not why T&S
agreed to sell, or continued to sell, it to the SS.192 Therefore, the
sale of Zyklon B was not specifically directed to facilitate the
crimes of the SS.193 The fact, however, that Tesch and others
became aware of its actual use and continued to sell it to the SS
was sufficient to prove that they were guilty of aiding and abetting the SS of committing crimes against humanity.194
Similarly, in the Dachau Concentration Camp Case, the prosecution had to prove “(1) that there was in force at Dachau a
system to ill-treat the prisoners and commit the crimes listed in
the charges, (2) that each accused was aware of the system, [and]
(3) that each accused, by his conduct ‘encouraged, aided and

Zyklon B, supra note 10, ¶ 93.
Id. ¶¶ 93–94, 101.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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abetted or participated’ in enforcing this system.”195 The aiding
and abetting actus reus standard set forth in this case does not
state that the defendants must have specifically directed their
actions to assisting the crimes committed in the camp.196 The
standard simply states that, by their actions, the crimes were
participated in, encouraged, or aided and abetted.197
As discussed above, the Tadić Trial Chamber followed the aiding and abetting standard set forth and developed by the post–
World War II tribunals.198 The Tadić Appeals Chamber used the
phrase “specific direction” in an attempt to differentiate between
the aiding and abetting and joint criminal enterprise standards.
The Court did not define or discuss specific direction. Several
cases thereafter use the language “specific direction” without explanation and others reject the standard outright.199
Arguably, the Perišić Appeals Chamber interprets the use of
the phrase “specific direction,” as used in the Tadić case, to mean
more than the Appeals Chamber in Tadić intended. In an attempt to demonstrate consistency among the cases in application of the standard, the Perišić Appeals Chamber holds that certain cases did not discuss specific direction because the accused
aider and abettor was present at, or proximate to, the facilitated
crimes.200 The Court then fails to describe what qualifies as
“proximate” or “remote” and simply states that such determinations are case specific. If the determination of whether or not
specific direction applies hinges on remoteness, it would seem
that courts would have endeavored to clarify what qualifies as
“remote.” Furthermore, considering modern telecommunications technology, it is unclear why remoteness should be a factor
at all since military commanders who are thousands of miles
away can be kept apprised of happenings on the ground in real
time.

195 Dachau, supra note 19, at 13. It should be noted that at the ICTY, this type
of case would typically be treated as a “JCE II” case. For a more in-depth discussion of JCE II, see ICTY Digest, supra note 48.
196 Id. at 8, 13.
197 Id.
198 Tadić TC Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 688.
199 See footnotes 59, 62, 66, and 69.
200 Arguably, the Perišić Appeals Judgment incorporates the Kuprešić Appeals
Judgment’s discussion regarding temporal distance, but there is no discussion
or citation regarding geographic distance.
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Multiple judgments, including from the Appeals Chamber itself, have now confirmed that the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s decision, holding that specific direction is, and has been, a required
element of the aiding and abetting actus reus, was incorrect. The
Appeals Chambers in the Charles Taylor and Šainović cases
wrote lengthy opinions on the issue of “specific direction,” analyzing the history of the aiding and abetting standard in the
post–World War II era, and determined that “specific direction”
is not an element of aiding and abetting.201 If the weight of the
post–World War II jurisprudence demonstrates that “specific direction” is not a required element, future international tribunals
that consider this issue should explicitly state that “specific direction” is not required and that the standard should be rejected.
B. The Arguments for Incorporating a “Reasonable Person”
Standard into Aiding and Abetting
Alternatively, there does appear to be some concern that if
“specific direction” is not a required element of aiding and abetting, aiding and abetting will be applied in an overbroad way.
The concern would be that governments or groups that have conducted extensive, reasonable due diligence regarding the act of
providing arms to certain governments, militaries, or groups, in
an attempt to ensure that those weapons are not used for war
crimes, could be found guilty for aiding and abetting if some of
those weapons are in fact used to commit war crimes.202
While the cases discussed above have either fully endorsed or
rejected the specific direction element, to the extent a court
wishes to engage in norm-building jurisprudential analysis, a
middle ground approach may be preferable. Part of the aiding
and abetting analysis should be whether the actor that provided
arms or assistance did in fact conduct reasonable due diligence
before providing such arms or assistance because, ultimately, it
is reasonable behavior one wants to encourage. Command responsibility incorporates just such a reasonable person standard
by requiring superiors to take “necessary and reasonable”

Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra note 21, ¶¶ 417–37; Šainović TC Judgment,
supra note 182, ¶¶ 1627–42, 1647–49.
202 See, e.g., Perišić Appeals Hearing Transcript, supra note 167, at 62, ll. 5–
12.
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measures to “prevent” or “punish” the commission of crimes by
their subordinates.203
If evidence exists that the actor providing arms or assistance,
for example, substantially researched who would be receiving
such arms or assistance, what the recipients intended to do with
the provisions, what the recipients actually did with the provisions, and stopped providing arms or assistance if it became apparent that the recipient, or subgroups of the recipient, were utilizing the provisions to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, then there should be no criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting. But, if there is evidence that no
such due diligence was conducted, that the provider knew that
the provisions were being used for nefarious purposes, that the
provider did nothing to discourage or stop such actions, or that
the provider continued to supply the offending recipients with
arms or assistance, then responsibility should follow. One must
be able to differentiate between providing legitimate military assistance where some arms, despite due diligence, end up falling
into the hands of one faction that uses them to commit crimes,
and aiding a genocidal operation, where one already has
knowledge that the group being aided is committing war crimes.
Perhaps an overabundance of concern about the former led to
the standard for aiding and abetting being so altered in Perišić
as to make it all but useless.
If a “reasonable person” due diligence standard were explicitly
set forth by the ICTY or other tribunals, actors would know how
to conduct themselves in a way that would not subject them to
criminal responsibility. If such were the case, those same actors
would not be hesitant to provide arms and assistance to legitimate recipients. The goal of international justice is not to discourage governments and other actors from assisting worthy
groups or from participating in legitimate humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping operations. Rather, the goal of international criminal justice is to hold actors accountable who knowingly participate, either directly or indirectly, in the commission
of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity.

See, e.g., ICTY Digest, supra note 48, 484–90 (describing what is required
to satisfy as “reasonable” measures by a superior, depending on the superior's
level of authority).
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CONCLUSION
The ICTY has contributed greatly to the development of international criminal law and ending impunity for the worst crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia. It has created legal precedent for international and domestic courts prosecuting genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes, and produced a sound
legacy. Unfortunately, the stringent requirement of a specific direction element reverses some of the ICTY’s positive momentum
by increasing the likelihood that culpable individuals will be acquitted because the standard is so difficult to meet. Courts considering similar situations now, or in the future, should either
reject the “specific direction” standard, or set forth a standard
that explicitly incorporates a “reasonable person” due diligence
standard. Doing so would ensure that governments and other
actors can provide legitimate assistance to other governments
and actors without risking criminal responsibility, and without
knowingly encouraging or assisting crimes.

